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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a social accounting model to examine the entrants, exits and 
transitions of individuals among a wide range of benefit categories in New Zealand. 
Transition rates and flows are estimated separately for periods before the global 
financial crisis (GFC) and periods following the crisis. The data were obtained from 
the Benefit Dynamics Dataset maintained by the Ministry of Social Development. The 
model is used to examine, using simulations, the implications for the time profile of 
changes in the stock of benefit recipients under a range of counterfactual situations. It 
is suggested that the model can provide a useful tool for policy analysis. 
 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Jason Raven, Mike O’Rourke and others in the Ministry of Social Development for 
help in accessing and using the Benefit Dynamics Dataset, and for comments on an earlier version of 
this paper. We are also grateful to Tony Burton, Ben Gleisner and others from the Labour Market and 
Welfare Team at the Treasury for their comments. We have benefited from comments on an earlier 
draft by Paul Rodway, Nathan Penny, David Rea, Sumon Majumdar and two referees. The views, 
opinions, findings and conclusions expressed in this paper are strictly those of the authors. They do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the New Zealand Treasury. 
2 New Zealand Treasury and Victoria University of Wellington. 
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1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explore the use of a social accounting approach to examine 
the entrants, exits and transitions of individuals among a wide range of benefit 
categories in New Zealand, using data from the Benefit Dynamics Dataset maintained 
by the Ministry of Social Development. An understanding of the factors affecting the 
number of individuals in receipt of various benefits requires information about 
movement from one benefit category to another, in addition to flows on and off the 
benefit system as a whole.3 The model is used to simulate the number of individuals 
in the various benefit categories, using assumptions about the variation over time in 
the inflows to the benefit system and transition rates among benefits.  
The approach can be used to examine the time profile of the numbers 
receiving various benefits, resulting from an underlying set of inflow, transition and 
exit rates. A policy changes concerning a single benefit type, by influencing 
transitions, can affect the numbers in receipt of a range of benefits; these 
consequences can be examined in detail, along with the speed of adjustment. For 
example, an initiative designed to increase the flow of individuals off a particular 
benefit type, and which moves those individuals into other states where they are more 
likely to move into full time employment and off the benefit system entirely, has 
different implications from a policy which moves individuals away from what may be 
an expensive benefit but into other states where they are more likely to remain for 
longer periods.  
Movements of individuals through the benefit system depend on the precise 
regulations, concerning for example eligibility. The analysis of specific policy 
changes would focus on particular flows that are likely to be affected. The dynamic 
properties also depend on a range of factors that are independent of the benefit 
system, such as structural or cyclical changes to probabilities of becoming 
                                                 
3 An analysis of flows among seven benefit categories in Australia is by Harris and Kalb (2005, who 
compare annual and spell-based transition matrices. Hall (2008) looked at how transitions from 
unemployment to sickness postpones returns to work in Sweden. New Zealand benefit flows were 
examined using an ethnographic approach by Shirley et al. (2001), emphasising how decisions are 
made within households, the role of local networks and perceptions, and so on.   
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unemployed or gaining employment, which are likely to have significant impacts on 
flows and therefore costs.4  
Although there have been some policy changes in recent years, particularly 
regarding the Invalid’s Benefit, by far the most important changes have arisen as a 
result of the global financial crisis (GFC). This is convenient for present purposes as 
the large changes observed for many flows following the GFC provide useful 
illustrations of the advantages of the approach and the potential value of recognising 
explicitly that changes take place to a system that is not in equilibrium, so that the 
consequences of any change can be much wider than anticipated. The transition rates 
and flows, measured over discrete periods of three months, are therefore estimated 
separately for a number of periods before the global financial crisis (GFC). These 
periods reflect relatively stable patterns of entry and movement and a stable policy 
environment. The rates are also estimated for several periods following the crisis, 
which saw substantial changes in a number of inflow rates. Simulations are reported 
for several assumptions about economic conditions over the period February 2011 to 
November 2016.5 
Section 2 presents the basic framework, outlines the relationships between 
stocks and flows and the way in which the model can be used to consider policy 
changes. The New Zealand flows data are described in Section 3. This section also 
defines the benefit categories and the construction of the transition matrices. 
Summary information regarding inflows and average durations, before and after the 
global financial crisis, are also briefly discussed. Section 4 reports simulations of 
benefit numbers up to November 2016 under several assumptions about the economic 
conditions over the period. Section 5 explores the potential implications of a reduction 
in inflows to Unemployment Benefits. Conclusions are in Section 6.  
2 The Framework of Analysis 
The flows of individuals among defined benefit categories or ‘states’ from one period 
to the next can be recorded in a social accounting matrix.6 Suppose the accounting 
                                                 
4 Changes in the age composition of the population and fertility rates, for example, can affect aggregate 
flows. 
5 Official Treasury and MSD forecasts of the number of benefit recipients are provided in the Budget 
Economic and Fiscal Update, and are based on estimated relationships between GDP and the number 
of benefit recipients. The purpose of the simulations presented here is to illustrate the impact of 
different counter-factual scenarios and illustrate the sensitivity of numbers to the underlying flows. 
6 For an extensive discussion of social accounting models, see Stone (1973). 
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period is three months, so that information is available about the state occupied by 
each individual at the beginning of each quarter.7 There are m states. Let , ,i j ts  (for 
, 1,...,i j m ) denote the number of people who move from state j to state i from 
period t to period t+1 (at the beginning of quarter t they are in state j and at the 
beginning of quarter  t+1 they are in state i). These flows are placed in a matrix 
 , ,t i j tS s . Let  ,t i tb b  denote the vector whose ith element is the number of 
people who enter state i from outside the labour market during period t (for example, 
those leaving full time education and inward migrants): these are referred to as 
‘inflows’. Similarly  ,t j td d  is the vector of exits at the end of period t for various 
reasons, including migration and death: these are referred to collectively as 
‘outflows’. Finally,  ,t j tn n  is the vector of stocks of individuals in each state, 
1,...,j m , at the start of period t. 
 
Figure 1 Relationship between Stocks and Flows 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The approach therefore ignores some very short spells of benefit receipt. A continuous time 
framework was examined in Creedy and Disney (1981a) who show the different implications for 
durations. The present model also does not allow for dependence on the past. An analysis of 
unemployment flows in New Zealand, distinguishing those with single and multiple spells, is by 
Stillman and Hyslop (2006). For an early treatment of population heterogeneity and multiple spells, 
and their effect on benefit eligibility, see Creedy and Disney (1981b).  
Inflows 
Outflows 
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The information about stocks and flows are displayed in Figure 1 where, for 
convenience, t subscripts are omitted. The flows take place from columns to rows. A 
prime attached to a variable indicates transposition, so that, for example, 'td  is the 
column vector of exits rewritten as a row. The inflows and outflows can be further 
divided where necessary. For example, some individuals may leave the benefit system 
by, for example, migrating, dying, or moving into employment with sufficiently large 
earnings.8  
Each flow (number of individuals) can be converted into a transition rate, 
, ,i j tc , which denotes the proportion of individuals who started quarter t in state j and 
moved into state i by the beginning of quarter t+1. Hence:  
 , ,, ,
,
i j t
i j t
j t
s
c
n
  (1) 
or matrix terms,  1tt tC S n
 , where the ‘hat’ indicates that the column vector forms the 
leading diagonal of a square matrix with zeros in the off-diagonals.9 
Letting i  denote a vector of units, the sum of elements in the ith row of S is 
expressed as Si, and noting that ni n , the ‘closing stocks’ are related to the ‘opening 
stocks’ and the flows according to: 
 
1t t t t
n C n b    (2) 
Moving forward one period: 
  2 1 1t t t t t tn C C n b b      (3) 
and: 
   3 2 1 1 2t t t t t t t tn C C C n b b b         (4) 
If transition rates and inflows remain constant over time, (4) becomes: 
  3 23t tn C n I C C b      (5) 
Here I denotes a unit matrix (a square matrix with a leading diagonal of units, and 
zeros elsewhere). The column sums of C are less than one and all the elements are 
                                                 
8 In the application below, exits are divided into five categories.  
9 The C matrix differs from a transition matrix familiar from Markov models, since the column sums 
do not add to 1 (the difference reflecting the outflows).  
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non-negative. Hence, if the process continues long enough, lim 0T
T
C   and 
  12  etc I C C I C      . The vector of equilibrium stocks is therefore: 
   1n I C b   (6) 
Furthermore, it can be shown that the average time in state j is   1,1 j jc   while the 
variance is  2, ,/ 1j j j jc c . 
Policy changes may be designed to affect a wide range of components of the 
social accounting framework. For example, changes to eligibility conditions for 
certain types of benefit may affect the number of people moving onto those benefits 
(both from outside the benefit system and transitions from other categories). Changes 
to the administration of benefits (including, for example, the monitoring of behaviour 
relating to moral hazard, the provision of information for potential benefit recipients 
regarding regulations, and so on) can affect flows of individuals in and out of a range 
of states. Changes to benefit levels and abatement rates, through their effects on 
individuals’ budget constraints and thus financial incentives, can also influence 
transitions. It is therefore possible to use the framework to examine the implications 
for benefit flows of various policy reforms, given a priori information about the likely 
effects on relevant elements of the matrix.  
The effects on equilibrium stocks of changes in the inflow vector are easily 
obtained from equation (6). Letting   1M I C    denote the ‘matrix multiplier’, the 
changes in the stocks are a multiple of the change in the flows for any category. A 
change in one of the elements of the inflow vector has effects on many of the stocks, 
not simply the category whose inflow has changed. Thus, if the jth element of b 
changes, the equilibrium stock changes in all categories, i, for which the ith row 
element, ijm , from the jth column of M is non zero.  
In equilibrium the outflows from each category must match the inflows, so 
that an increase in the latter can only be matched by outflows after the stocks have 
built up sufficiently. The extra inflows in any category also lead to higher movements 
among benefit categories. In a large system, the consequences can easily be obtained 
from the matrix multiplier, M, but of course the elements of M are not transparent 
from the flow coefficients, given the matrix inversion involved. The speed of 
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adjustment to the new equilibrium also depends on the speed of convergence of the 
powers of C towards zero, as is evident from equation (5). The effects of changes in 
the elements of C itself are also discussed in Appendix C.  
3 New Zealand Flows Data 
This section describes the data and construction of the matrices used below: further 
details are in Appendix A. Summary information is also reported on the average 
durations and entrants. 
3.1 The Data and Construction of Matrices 
The data used here were obtained from the Benefit Dynamics Dataset maintained by 
the Ministry of Social Development. This dataset includes information on all people 
who received any main working-age social welfare benefit in the period of study, 
from February 2005 to February 2011.10  It provides information on their 
demographic characteristics, and traces their changing benefit status and other 
circumstances from the beginning of the study period (for benefits current at that date) 
or from the date they are first granted benefit in that period (for new grants).11  
The first stage involved constructing the relevant flow matrices and vectors for 
each quarter over the period, resulting in 24 matrices. At this stage, benefit recipients 
were divided into 63 mutually exclusive categories. After examination of these 
matrices, the number of benefit categories was reduced to 47, largely by 
amalgamating different age groups within a category type: some age groups were 
found to contain few individuals.12 Examination of the many matrices showed relative 
stability over 13 pre-global financial crisis quarters (pre-GFC) from February 2005 to 
April 2008. There are clearly fewer observations for the post-global financial crisis 
period (post-GFC), covering 11 quarters from May 2008 to February 2011, but again 
the flows showed little change. Hence, a dividing line was drawn between pre-GFC 
and post-GFC flows and the many matrices were reduced to only two sets of flow 
matrices and vectors, by computing average flows in the two periods.13 A difficulty 
                                                 
10 Starting from February 2005 gives a long period with no substantial benefit reforms, and February 
2011 is the last period for which data are available. The post-GFC period thus excludes any effects of 
the Christchurch earthquakes.  
11 It also traces the benefit histories of partners and dependent children included in benefits. 
12 Clearly, there remains a small amount of heterogeneity within the groups. 
13 In view of this averaging process, no explicit allowance is made here for seasonality (particularly 
regarding unemployment benefit inflows). 
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arises in dealing with exits from benefits. Instead of having a single vector of 
‘outflows’, d, many reasons are recorded. In addition, this part of the dataset has a 
significant number of missing entries. Appendix B describes the method used to 
divide the exits into meaningful categories. 
Space limitations clearly prevent the full tables being reproduced here; they 
can be obtained from Aziz et al. (2013). However, a useful indication is provided by 
Tables 1 and 2, which show consolidated (average quarterly) flow matrices for the 
pre- and post- GFC periods respectively.14 These matrices involve 10 broad benefit 
categories and four exit reasons (along with a ‘missing data’ exit category). The 
mutually exclusive categories are Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB), Invalid’s Benefit 
(IB), Sickness Benefit (SB) and Unemployment Benefit (UB). Domestic Purposes 
Benefit is available to sole parents and carers. Each of the benefits is subject to means 
testing, with two abatement rates and income thresholds. For a detailed description of 
the benefits, eligibility conditions and means testing, see Ministry of Social 
Development (2010). In each case the initials are followed by the relevant age group: 
for example DPB18-59 refers to individuals aged 18 to 59 who are in receipt of 
Domestic Purposes Benefit.  
A feature of the flows in both matrices is that movement into work is not the 
dominant reason for leaving the benefit system. Even where this is the modal reason 
(as for DPB18-9 and UB18-59) the majority of the exits in a quarter are for other 
reasons.15  In considering the off-diagonal elements of the flows matrix, there are 
substantial quarterly movements from Unemployment to Sickness Benefits, and in 
turn from Sickness to Invalid’s Benefit. In the pre-GFC period, the latter flows 
actually exceeded the number of direct entries to Invalid’s Benefit from outside the 
system. These movements were reduced somewhat in the post-GFC period, when also 
flows from Sickness to Unemployment were much higher than in the pre-GFC period. 
In the post-GFC period there were fewer moves directly into Invalid’s Benefit from 
Unemployment. This is in fact the main area where reforms were directed over the 
relevant period, so that the changes in these flows can probably be attributed to policy 
rather than economic conditions.16 Although the quarterly entries into Domestic 
Purposes Benefit are lower than the entries to Sickness or Unemployment Benefits, 
                                                 
14 The averages are taken over 13 pre-GFC quarters and 11 post-GFC quarters. 
15 The coding schedule actually allows for over 400 ‘other reasons’.  
16 For detailed discussion of factors affecting the number of recipients of Sickness and Invalid’s 
Benefit, and trends over time, see Fletcher (2009).  
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the stock of individuals in receipt of DPB is substantially higher than for any other 
benefit type, because of its high average duration. A similar property applies to 
numbers receiving Invalid’s Benefit, where stocks are exceeded only by DPBs.  
Comparing the two tables shows by far the largest change is for entries to UB, 
particularly by those aged 18-59, although more older workers are observed to move 
into paid employment post-GFC. It is shown below that most of the higher entries to 
DPB are of carers with no children and no earnings. Presumably these are carers who 
were previously working, perhaps in casual jobs and, on becoming unemployed as a 
result of the GFC, they receive DPB rather than the lower UB.  Importantly, the 
differences between the totals at the beginning and end of each quarter in each of the 
tables indicate that the systems are not in equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Pre-GFC Flows 
 
 
DPB 
18-59 
DPB 
60-64 
IB 
18-59 
IB 
60-64 
SB 
18-59 
SB 
60-64 
U<18 
 
UB 
18-59 
UB 
60-64 
Misc 
 
Entrants 
 
Total 
 
DPB18-59 91,769 0 14 0 959 0 166 366 0 93 5,615 98,982 
DPB60-64 183 4,607 0 0 0 6 0 0 14 8 207 5,026 
IB18-59 156 0 61,649 0 1,146 0 163 90 0 13 938 64,154 
IB60-64 1 28 654 12,422 14 235 0 1 39 3 232 13,629 
SB18-59 281 0 59 0 36,058 0 35 1,454 0 195 7,041 45,123
SB60-64 0 2 0 3 260 3,615 0 6 130 7 431 4,455 
U<18 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,638 0 0 0 1,096 3,733 
UB18-59 351 0 12 0 799 0 130 23,989 0 616 11,841 37,737 
UB60-64 0 3 0 1 4 39 0 135 5,709 12 410 6,314 
Misc 134 5 2 0 144 4 47 1,212 18 7,045 1,166 9,777
Death 24 7 423 143 60 15 4 29 6 0 0 690 
Migration 462 12 97 10 180 18 8 700 82 8 0 1,577 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 155 0 0 1,303 0 1,458 
Other 3,200 401 409 607 4,126 347 342 6,597 571 107 0 16,707 
Work 3,511 29 382 24 1,384 74 106 7,190 161 47 0 12,908 
Total 100,074 5,093 63,700 13,212 45,134 4,353 3,793 41,749 6,729 9,457 28,976 
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Table 2 Post-GFC Flows 
 
 
DPB 
18-59 
DPB 
60-64 
IB 
18-59 
IB 
60-64 
SB 
18-59 
SB 
60-64 
U<18 
 
UB 
18-59 
UB 
60-64 
Misc 
 
Entrants 
 
Total 
 
DPB18-59 93,831 0 28 0 1,102 0 186 398 0 130 6,594 102,268 
DPB60-64 178 4,271 0 1 1 7 0 0 11 9 261 4,739 
IB18-59 99 0 67,042 0 852 0 173 58 0 12 965 69,200 
IB60-64 0 19 735 15,588 12 212 0 0 18 2 311 16,897 
SB18-59 367 0 161 0 41,722 0 37 1,329 0 237 8,376 52,229 
SB60-64 0 4 2 13 255 4,507 0 5 77 13 625 5,501 
U<18 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,684 0 0 0 1,077 3,761 
UB18-59 461 0 15 0 1,249 0 143 33,082 0 1,106 21,021 57,076 
UB60-64 0 4 0 1 3 49 0 106 2,570 20 582 3,336 
Misc 161 6 5 0 165 5 59 1,275 15 9,797 1,514 13,003 
Death 21 4 408 177 61 13 2 12 4 1 0 703 
Migration 375 10 92 19 173 25 10 741 37 12 0 1,495 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 122 0 0 1,443 0 1,565
Other 2,613 317 374 678 4,066 407 292 6,827 307 148 0 16,029 
Work 2,839 41 370 50 1,364 93 68 7,118 199 56 0 12,200 
Total 100,946 4,678 69,232 16,527 51,024 5,319 3,776 50,952 3,236 12,987 41,326 
 
 
 
3.2 The 47 Benefit Categories 
In producing the simulations reported below, social accounting matrices with 
47 benefit categories were used, although for succinctness the final numbers in each 
category are aggregated for presentation purposed. The mutually exclusive types are 
described in Table 3, using the following system is used. The notation Aa_B_C refers 
to benefit type A, for age category, a (a=18 refers to 18-29; a=30 refers to 30-59; 
a=60 refers to 60-64). B refers to the age of the youngest child (B=0 refers to 0-4; 
B=5 refers to 5-13; B=14 refers to 14 and older; B=nc indicates ‘no child’). The letter 
C indicates earnings (where C=e refers to earnings of $1-200 per week; C=f refers to 
>$200 per week; C=‘no’ indicates zero earnings; and C=‘wrk’ denotes positive 
earnings). This system reduces simply to Aa_C where the presence of children is not 
relevant: this applies to each of the IB, SB and UB categories. 
The average number of entrants into each benefit category, before and after 
the GFC, are reported in Table 4. The largest increases in average entrants are for 
those with no earnings in all of the basic categories; these are Domestic Purposes 
Benefit (DPB), Invalid’s Benefit (IB), Sickness Benefit (SB) and Unemployment 
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Benefit (UB). Not surprisingly, the largest increases by far are for UBs, particularly in 
the age groups 18-29 and 30-59 with no earnings (18_no  and 30_no respectively). 
However, increases in the corresponding SB categories are also substantial, 
The average number of quarters spent in each benefit category, along with 
standard deviations, are also given in Table 4, using the expressions in subsection 
2.1.17 The largest increases are for the DPB categories with no dependent children and 
no earnings in age groups 18-29 and 30-59 (18_nc_no and 30_nc_no), which increase 
from 18.98 and 13.42 quarters respectively to 22.15 and 21.30 after the GFC. Large 
increases are also observed for those in receipt of IB with no earnings (categories 
18_no and 30_no). Smaller increases are for UB recipients in the same age groups 
with no earnings (categories 18_no and 30_no). The average duration for those 
receiving UB in the group aged 60-64 with no earnings (category 60_no) fell from 
6.07 before the GFC to 4.45 quarters after the GFC, reflecting a higher propensity to 
move into both the corresponding SB category and into work.18  
The time units are quarters, so that the change from 19 to 22 for DPB 
recipients aged 18-29 with no children and zero earnings (DPB18_nc_no) translates to 
a change of 36 weeks. Furthermore the standard deviation for the DPB and IB 
categories mentioned above, for which the increases in (relatively high) average 
durations are largest, are much larger than for other benefit types at over 4 quarters.  
                                                 
17 The standard deviations relate to the duration distributions; they are not standard errors of the 
estimated average durations.  
18 The proportion making this move increased from 0.019 to 0.024.  
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Table 3Benefit Categories 
 
DPB18_0_e  DPB or WB, aged 18 - <29, youngest child aged 0 - <5, earning $1 - $200 pw 
DPB18_0_f  DPB or WB, aged 18 - <29, youngest child aged 0 - <5,earning more than $200 pw 
DPB18_0_no  DPB or WB, aged 18 - <29, youngest child aged 0 - <5,earning $0 pw or missing 
DPB18_5+_no  DPB or WB, aged 18 - <29, youngest child aged 5+, earning $0 pw or missing 
DPB18_5+_wrk  DPB or WB, aged 18 - <29, youngest child aged 5+, and earning > $0 pw 
DPB18_nc_no  DPB or WB, aged 18 - <29, no dependent children, earning $0 or missing 
DPB18_nc_wrk  DPB or WB, aged 18 - <29, no dependent children, earning > $0 pw 
DPB30_0_e  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, youngest child 0 - <5, earning $1 - $200 pw 
DPB30_0_f  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, youngest child aged 0 - <5, earning more than $200 pw 
DPB30_0_no  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, youngest child aged 0 - <5, earning $0 pw or missing 
DPB30_14_e  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, youngest child aged 14+, earning $1 - $200 pw 
DPB30_14_f  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, youngest child aged 14+, earning more than $200 pw 
DPB30_14_no  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, youngest child aged 14+, earning $0 pw or missing 
DPB30_5_e  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, youngest child aged 5 - <14, earning $1 - $200 pw 
DPB30_5_f  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, youngest child aged 5 - <14, earning more than $200 pw 
DPB30_5_no  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, youngest child aged 5 - <14, earning $0 pw or missing 
DPB30_nc_e  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, no dependent children, earning $1 - $200 pw 
DPB30_nc_f  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, no dependent children, earning more than $200 pw 
DPB30_nc_no  DPB or WB, aged 30 - <60, no dependent children, earning $0 pw or missing 
DPB60_no  DPB or WB, aged 60 - <65, no dependent children, earning $0 pw or missing 
DPB60_wrk  DPB or WB, aged 60 - <65, no dependent children, and earnings > $0 pw 
IB18_e  IB, aged 18 - <30,  earning $1 - $200 pw 
IB18_f  IB, aged 18 - <30,  earning more than $200 pw
IB18_no  IB, aged 18 - <30,  earning $0 pw or missing
IB30_e  IB, aged 30 - <60,  earning $1 - $200 pw 
IB30_f  IB, aged 30 - <60,  earning more than $200 pw 
IB30_no  IB, aged 30 - <60,  earning $0 pw or missing 
IB60_no  IB, aged 60 - <65,  earning $0 pw or missing 
IB60_wrk  IB, aged 60 - <65, earning > $0 pw 
SB18_e  SB, aged 18 - <30,  earning $1 - $200 pw 
SB18_f  SB, aged 18 - <30,  earning more than $200 pw 
SB18_no  SB, aged 18 - <30,  earning $0 pw or missing 
SB30_e  SB, aged 30 - <60,  earning $1 - $200 pw 
SB30_f  SB, aged 30 - <60,  earning more than $200 pw 
SB30_no  SB, aged 30 - <60,  earning $0 pw or missing 
SB60_no  SB, aged 60 - <65,  earning $0 pw or missing 
SB60_wrk  SB, aged 60 - <65, earning > $0 pw 
u18  a benefit but aged under 18 years 
UB18_e  UB, aged 18 - <30,  earning $1 - $200 pw 
UB18_f  UB, aged 18 - <30,  earning more than $200 pw 
UB18_no  UB, aged 18 - <30,  earning $0 pw or missing 
UB30_e  UB, aged 30 - <60,  earning $1 - $200 pw 
UB30_f  UB, aged 30 - <60,  earning more than $200 pw 
UB30_no  UB, aged 30 - <60,  earning $0 pw or missing 
UB60_no  UB, aged 60 - <65,  earning $0 pw or missing 
UB60_wrk  UB, aged 60 - <65, and earnings > $0 pw 
Misc  other benefits, including CSI and training benefits 
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Table 4 Average Entrants per Quarter and Durations 
  
  
Pre-GFC 
  
Post-GFC 
States Entrants Average SD Entrants Average SD 
DPB18_0_e 192 3.03 1.42 122 2.61 1.27 
DPB18_0_f 4 1.14 0.38 4 1.16 0.4 
DPB18_0_no 1,331 5.67 2.16 1,024 4.39 1.84 
DPB18_5+_no 209 4.45 1.86 172 3.68 1.64 
DPB18_5+_wrk 40 3.19 1.48 26 2.7 1.3 
DPB18_nc_no 363 18.98 4.24 1,096 22.15 4.6
DPB18_nc_wrk 37 4.9 1.98 106 4.43 1.85 
DPB30_0_e 127 3.12 1.46 83 2.67 1.29 
DPB30_0_f 4 1.21 0.46 4 1.17 0.41
DPB30_0_no 789 4.8 1.95 596 3.77 1.66 
DPB30_14_e 89 4.62 1.9 99 3.63 1.62 
DPB30_14_f 4 1.33 0.57 7 1.28 0.53
DPB30_14_no 404 6.39 2.32 478 4.74 1.93 
DPB30_5_e 282 3.93 1.71 189 3.15 1.47 
DPB30_5_f 14 1.26 0.51 14 1.25 0.5
DPB30_5_no 1,106 5.07 2.02 925 3.91 1.71 
DPB30_nc_e 111 6.81 2.41 246 6.27 2.3 
DPB30_nc_f 5 1.31 0.55 11 1.43 0.65 
DPB30_nc_no 504 13.42 3.52 1,393 21.3 4.51 
DPB60_no 161 8.24 2.69 209 9.08 2.84 
DPB60_wrk 46 6.54 2.35 52 6.12 2.26 
IB18_e 15 5.53 2.13 11 5.22 2.05 
IB18_f 1 1.2 0.45 0 1.21 0.46 
IB18_no 163 13.85 3.58 162 17.19 4.02 
IB30_e 44 7.21 2.49 35 6.48 2.34 
IB30_f 2 1.23 0.48 2 1.25 0.5 
IB30_no 714 21.6 4.54 755 24.59 4.86 
IB60_no 218 14.72 3.7 297 16.26 3.91 
IB60_wrk 14 7.19 2.49 14 6.27 2.29 
SB18_e 107 2.1 1.05 111 2.08 1.04
SB18_f 6 1.14 0.38 8 1.14 0.38 
SB18_no 2,824 3.04 1.43 3,438 3.47 1.57 
SB30_e 198 3.45 1.57 189 3.31 1.52
SB30_f 19 1.25 0.5 21 1.24 0.49 
SB30_no 3,887 5.44 2.11 4,608 6.24 2.29 
SB60_no 401 5.38 2.09 589 6.03 2.24
SB60_wrk 30 4.25 1.8 36 3.93 1.71 
u18 1,096 3.28 1.51 1,077 3.46 1.57 
UB18_e 590 1.44 0.67 923 1.59 0.77 
UB18_f 47 1.08 0.28 69 1.06 0.25 
UB18_no 6,255 1.87 0.93 11,833 2.26 1.12 
UB30_e 399 2.09 1.04 528 2.29 1.13 
UB30_f 55 1.16 0.4 92 1.13 0.36 
UB30_no 4,495 2.7 1.31 7,577 3.34 1.53 
UB60_no 365 6.07 2.25 529 4.45 1.86 
UB60_wrk 46 4.18 1.78 53 3.14 1.46 
Misc 1,166 3.92 1.71 1,514 4.07 1.75 
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3.3 Decompositions 
Having constructed two sets of average quarterly flow coefficients, relating to 13 pre-
GFC and 11 post-GFC periods, along with two vectors of average entrants and 
numbers on each benefit, this subsection considers the effects on benefit numbers of 
alternative combinations. All the simulations are carried out using the matrices and 
vectors for 47 benefit types, as described above, and results are reported for various 
aggregates. 
Importantly these are ‘what if’ scenarios, showing the potential impact that 
different transition probabilities could have on benefit numbers; they do not pretend to 
provide estimates of future stocks. In a practical reform analysis, the inflows would 
not be expected to remain constant and a particular time profile for changes in inflows 
would be modelled. This can easily be accommodated in the present framework. The 
present simulations illustrate the importance of allowing for the inter-benefit flows 
when changes take place to a system that is out of equilibrium. The separate effects of 
inflow and transition rates can be identified. 
Figure 2 shows the effects on the time profile of total benefit recipients over 
the period from February 2011 to November 2016 of starting from average pre-GFC 
stocks, holding quarterly inflows constant at their average pre-GFC levels, and using 
the two different sets of forward flow coefficients. First, the simulated benefit 
numbers do not follow a simple monotonic adjustment towards a final equilibrium 
stock. Second, the total number of benefit recipients is consistently higher for the 
post-GFC transitions, reflecting the longer durations for the majority of benefit types. 
By 2016 the two simulations differ by about 25,000 individuals.  
By contrast, the profiles in Figure 3 are constructed using the constant post-
GFC average entrants and post-GFC initial stocks. The difference between the two 
totals by November 2016 is similar to that shown in Figure 2, although the time 
profiles are quite different. In Figure 3, the two simulations consistently increase over 
the period. As expected, the total number on the benefit system is much higher when 
the post-GFC entrants and initial stocks are used.   
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Figure 2 Effects of Different Transitions with Pre-GFC Stocks and Inflows: All 
Benefits Combined 
 
Figure 3 Effects of Different Transitions with Post-GFC Stocks and Inflows: All 
Benefits Combined 
 
 
The profiles of different benefit types do not necessarily follow similar 
patterns to those in Figures 2 and 3. For example, simulations of DPB recipients are 
shown in Figures 4 and 5 using respectively the pre-GFC and post-GFC initial stocks 
and inflows. Figure 4 shows that the use of pre-GFC inflows and initial stocks 
generates non-monotonic profiles of DPB numbers over time for each set of 
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transitions. In this case the post-GFC transition matrix produces lower stocks of DPB 
beneficiaries than the pre-GFC matrix in the early years of the projection period, only 
overtaking the pre-GFC transitions in mid-2014.  In Figure 5, which uses the post-
GFC birth vector each period, the DPB numbers increase continually over the period 
for both transition matrices, with the post-GFC transitions overtaking the numbers 
produced by pre-GFC transitions by early in 2013.   
 
Figure 4 Effects of Different Transitions with Pre-GFC Stocks and Inflows: DPB 
 
Figure 5 Effects of Different Transitions with Post-GFC Stocks and Inflows: 
DPB 
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4 Simulations of Benefit Numbers 
This section reports a range of simulations, up to November 2016, which provide 
counterfactuals against which various policy reforms could be examined. The 
approach involves taking the actual stocks in each benefit category at November 
2010, and then making assumptions about the quarterly entries and transitions over 
the subsequent quarters. As these simulations are alternative counterfactuals, the 
assumption that the inflows and transitions remain unchanged for a number of 
quarters at either their pre- or post-GFC values, or at transitional values, reflects an 
explicit assumption that there are no policy changes over the simulation period. 
One simulation exercise produces the time profile of stocks on the assumption 
that pre-GFC (2005-08) inflow, outflow and inter-benefit transition rates apply from 
February 2011 and continue across the forecast period: this is the hypothetical 
situation of an immediate return to Pre-GFC flows. Other profiles involve different 
assumptions about the timing of the return to pre-GFC transitions. Thus, the profile 
labelled Post-GFC+Recovery assumes that post-GFC transitions prevail until 
February 2012 after which the pre-GFC transition rates and entries apply. The profile 
labelled Post-GFC->Transition->Pre-GFC assumes that post-GFC transitions prevail 
till November 2012 but there is a delay before Pre-GFC transitions apply.  Finally, the 
Post-GFC profile assumes that post-GFC transitions prevail across the projection 
period.  
All simulations thus begin from the same vector of stocks. These clearly do 
not reflect a long run equilibrium, especially since the actual November 2010 stocks 
arise from circumstances which have operated for a relatively short time. As 
explained in Section 2, the application of fixed inflows and transition rates ultimately 
produces an equilibrium in which the total outflows are matched by inflows, and the 
vector of stocks of individuals in each benefit category remain fixed. Three of the four 
counterfactuals ultimately move to, and then continue to apply, the pre-GFC inflows 
and transition rates. Hence it is clear that these cases will ultimately converge on the 
same vector of the distribution of individuals across benefit types. It can take many 
periods to approach the equilibrium, although the stocks for some benefit types may 
converge more quickly than others.  
An important implication of starting from a disequilibrium stock of 
beneficiaries is that, when switching to a new set of inflows and transitions which 
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imply lower equilibrium stocks in all benefit categories, the numbers in receipt of 
some of the benefits need not necessarily initially fall. The numbers in some benefit 
categories may increase for a period, particularly if the initial stocks involve large 
disequilibrium numbers of those benefit types from which there are significant flows 
into the category of interest.  
The time paths of all benefits combined, for each of the counterfactual cases, 
are shown in Figure 6. There are substantial differences at the end of the projection 
period, even for the three counterfactuals having identical long run equilibrium 
numbers. Furthermore, the movement towards the equilibrium is not monotonic, even 
when the shift to pre-GFC rates implies an immediate fall in total numbers.  
 
Figure 6 All Benefits Combined 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the implications for DPB recipients. In this case, the shift from post-
GFC inflows and transition rates to pre-GFC rates does not imply a reduction in 
numbers, but simply a slowing down in their rate of increase, for each of the three 
less-pessimistic cases. At the end of the projection period, the three counterfactuals 
continue to produce quite different stocks. 
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Figure 7 Domestic Purposes Benefit 
 
 
The importance of allowing for inter-benefit movements, and the effect of 
changing mobility patterns from a disequilibrium situation, is shown in Figure 8 for 
the case of Invalid’s Benefit. A shift to pre-GFC inflows and transition rates initially 
leads to higher numbers in receipt of IB than under post-GFC conditions, for all the 
three relevant counterfactuals. This result is perhaps counter-intuitive, particularly as 
the flows onto IB from outside the benefit system are generally higher under post-
GFC conditions and the average time spent in each of the IB categories is higher in 
the post-GFC transitions than for the pre-GFC transitions. However, the higher IB 
stock is only a temporary phenomenon. In Figure 8 the projection period is extended 
to November 2022 and for each of the three more optimistic counterfactuals the stock 
of IB recipients eventually falls below that arising from the continued post-GFC 
entrants and movements. For example, for a return to pre-GFC conditions in the initial 
simulation period, the stock intersects the profile of post-GFC numbers by November 
2016. 
It was shown in Table 2 that flows onto SB are relatively high and increase 
substantially as a result of the GFC. This is especially true of the younger SB 
categories. A characteristic of the inter-benefit transitions, shown for the broad 
categories in Tables 1 and 2, is that the movement from SB to IB is higher in the pre-
GFC period than in post-GFC conditions. It was mentioned that this difference largely 
results from the policy changes relating to IB, which recognised that movement from 
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SB to IB was quite ‘relaxed’ and that IB stocks thus contained relatively more people 
with shorter durations.19 Hence the return to pre-GFC mobility patterns, at the 
beginning of the projection period, returns to a situation where there are relatively 
more movements from SB to IB, from a position of very high SB numbers. These 
features combine to generate the temporary rise in IB numbers above the post-GFC 
counterfactual: the latter may have a lower probability of moving from SB to IB, but 
given the larger inflows the stocks eventually overtake the pre-GFC simulation.20 
Figure 9 shows that the large differences in the inflows to SB categories 
produce quite rapid reductions in SB numbers following a shift from post-GFC to pre-
GFC conditions. The two most optimistic counterfactual cases converge rapidly 
towards their equilibrium in view of the dominance of the inflows from outside the 
benefit system. Unemployment benefit numbers are shown in Figure 10. The 
differences between inflows to unemployment between the pre- and post-GFC 
conditions, combined with the small number of movements into UB categories from 
other benefit types, means that the three most optimistic counterfactuals shift quickly 
to the new equilibrium. 
 
 
Figure 8 Numbers in Receipt of Invalid’s Benefit 
 
 
                                                 
19 The policy change re-categorised many people, who were shifted from IB to SB, as well as making 
transition into IB harder. 
20 In a more extensive exercise it would, for example, be useful to modify the relevant pre-GFC 
coefficients to reflect the policy change.  
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Figure 9 Numbers in Receipt of Sickness Benefit 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Numbers in Receipt of Unemployment Benefit 
 
 
5 Effects of Changes in Unemployment Entry Rates 
The previous section considered changes to inflows and transitions arising from 
changing economic conditions. The framework can also be used to consider a 
specified change to one or more features of the benefit system arising from a policy 
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change. The potential impact on inflows to selected benefit categories and associated 
exit rates may be specified, drawing on a range of extraneous information.21 An 
advantage is that implications can be examined for benefit types other than those for 
which reforms are being debated. Furthermore, as stressed earlier, the dynamics of a 
system, which is out of equilibrium when a change arises, can be investigated.  
Suppose a change in circumstances is expected to arise in May 2013 which 
influences only the quarterly rate of entrants to the range of unemployment benefits, 
while all other flows and transition rates remain at the observed post-GFC levels. The 
details – whether of a change in market circumstances or a change in the eligibility 
conditions – need not be specified here. Figure 11 illustrates the subsequent time 
profile of the stock of unemployment benefit recipients over all UB categories, for a 
range of percentage reductions in the inflows: policies 1a, 1b and 1c respectively 
involve 2.5, 4 and 6 per cent reductions in entrants of all UB categories.  
It has been seen earlier that unemployment stocks move relatively more 
quickly than other benefit types towards new steady-state values, and this is also 
observed for this simple change. Changes in other broadly defined benefit types are 
relatively small in this case.22 
Figure 11 Projected Unemployment Benefit Stocks over Time 
 
                                                 
21 Such information is needed because the various rates are not estimated as functions of a range of 
variables, but are simply computed from observed flows. In practice, many reforms to the welfare 
system involve innovations, so that econometric estimates of, say, hazard functions, cannot necessarily 
provide guidance.  
22 However, more substantial changes can be observed for particular types of UB claimant, where there 
are larger movements to other categories.  
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At the stage when the change is expected to take place, the stock of UB 
recipients is not in equilibrium even though the various rates were constant, because 
of the build-up in stocks resulting from the lower post-GFC exit rates (compared with 
those before the GFC). Furthermore, some movements into UB categories arise from 
other benefit types within the system, and the stocks in those ‘source’ categories are 
not in equilibrium. The diagram shows that the reduction in the stock over time (for 
each change in the inflow rate), when compared with the stock when the change 
arises, is smaller than the reduction when measured against the counterfactual of no 
change in inflows. The contrast between such comparisons would be much greater if 
the assumed change in the inflow rate were to occur while the counterfactual profile is 
rising much more steeply. A key point is that the effectiveness of a policy reform 
needs to be based on a sound counterfactual. In other words, simple ex post 
comparisons of changing stocks of benefit recipients may not provide an accurate 
measure of the effectiveness of a policy reform.  
6 Conclusions 
This paper has presented a social accounting framework designed to examine benefit 
flows in N ew Zealand. Quarterly entry, transition and exit rates for 47 benefit types 
were obtained using average values observed for a number of years before and after 
the global financial crisis. Simulations over time of the numbers of individuals in 
receipt of a range of benefits were obtained under alternative assumptions about 
inflow and transition rates.  
One advantage of the approach presented here is that the dynamics and 
complexities of benefit flows can be investigated in detail. The approach recognises 
that a change is imposed on a dynamic system that is not in equilibrium. Existing 
stocks need to work their way through the revised structure, of which just a small 
number of transition rates are affected by any policy change. The final effect on the 
number of benefit recipients are not apparent immediately, but may take some time to 
settle down. In the medium term of three or four years, the stocks can be substantially 
affected by the economic conditions at the time of the change, and the assumed 
conditions over the projection period (even when the equilibrium stocks are expected 
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to be the same – as with the three most optimistic counterfactual cases considered 
above). 
The dynamics of adjustments to revised inflow and exit rates, consequent on 
policy changes, mean that the ex post evaluation of policy initiatives is far from 
straightforward. The speed and indeed the direction of adjustments to benefit numbers 
depend on a vast range of flows, not only those flows which are targeted by a policy 
change. Furthermore, it may in some cases appear that a reform has little or no effect, 
if the numbers in receipt of a benefit a year or so after the reform are only slightly 
below those when the reform was enacted. However, the need to consider the 
numbers in relation to a well-specified counterfactual, not the stock at the time of 
implementation, is paramount. If the counterfactual suggests that the numbers would 
increase substantially without a policy change, a policy change which involves only a 
slight increase, from the time of implementation, might wrongly be judged a failure. 
Alternatively, and perhaps even more worryingly, a policy change which results in 
beneficiary stocks that are only slightly below or similar to the counterfactual, which 
itself implies a large fall in the absence of any intervention, may wrongly be judged to 
have been successful.  
It is suggested that the approach examined here can provide a useful tool for 
the analysis of alternative policies and exogenous changes in the economy which are 
expected (or designed) to lead to changes in the pattern of transitions into and among 
different benefit categories. 
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Appendix A. The Benefit Dynamics Dataset 
The BDD dataset is derived from the SWIFTT benefit payments system. Data 
generated by taking snapshots of SWIFTT data at given points in time are held on the 
Information Analysis Platform (IAP).  In raw form, the historical data do not readily 
permit analysis of benefit dynamics. The variables of interest are distributed across a 
number of different structures and matching routines are required to link them with 
spells on benefit. The BDD links information recorded in SWIFTT for the same 
individual over time and organises the data in a form amenable to longitudinal 
analysis. In the December 2003 update, the data set was enhanced to incorporate 
selected variables from the job seeker register system SOLO and the Unified Client 
View Phase Two (UCVII) system, other administrative data systems held by MSD. 
The BDD are stored in the secure environment of the IAP and access is restricted to a 
small number of authorised analysts. The dataset contains information that could be 
used to identify individual benefit recipients.   
The dataset covers the period from 1 January 1993 to the date of the most 
recent update. From October 2010, the data are updated at the end of each month 
(previously updates were quarterly).  These updates are each created with a lag of at 
least two to three months to allow retrospective action to ‘bed down’ records for the 
end of the period.   
Because of retrospective action, successive versions of the BDD will give a 
different benefit history for small numbers of individuals, and analyses repeated on a 
later version of the data set may produce slightly different results.  In order to 
minimise interruption to projects using a given version of the data set, the most recent 
update and the one that preceded it are both available through the IAP.  The year and 
month of the update is indicated by the four digits at the end of the name of each file – 
1006 indicates the update to 30 June 2010 for example.  
 
Appendix B. Adjustment of Exit Frequencies 
In examining the reasons for leaving each benefit type, the data relating to reasons for 
leaving benefits contain many cases where no code is given. This appendix explains 
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how extraneous information about the distribution of reasons for exit in aggregate, for 
each group of benefits, can be used to adjust the data.  
Let 0ja  denote the number of individuals in benefit category j who exit the 
benefit system at the end of the quarter, for whom no reason is given. As above, let 
,i jd  denote the number moving from benefit type j for reason i. The number for whom 
a reason is known is thus: 
 ,j i j
i
g d  (7) 
The aggregate proportion leaving for reason i, for those for whom a reason is known, 
is given by: 
 
,i j
j
i
j
j
d
r
g



 (8) 
In addition, information about these proportions is available from another data source. 
Denote the extraneous values by *ir . It is desired to adjust the ,i jd  by allocating the 
unknown values in such a way that the new aggregate proportions approximately 
match the values from the additional data source.  
First, adjust all ,i jd  using: 
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And then obtain: 
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Finally, adjust the 
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This procedure was used to benchmark the exit rates in the social accounting 
framework. As mentioned earlier, there are many reasons for a person on benefit to 
leave the benefit system. The four main reasons are: finding work; death; migration 
and; a change in circumstances such as re-partnering.  
The data for exits in the Benefit Dynamics Dataset were accurate in aggregate; 
they correctly captured the total number of people leaving the benefit system in a 
particular quarter. However, they did not provide much detail on why they were 
leaving. Therefore exit rates were derived from the 2008 ‘Linked Employer-
Employee Data’ feasibility study. 23 This study documented the reasons why people 
left the benefit system in great detail. For example the study found that of the people 
who moved off the Unemployment Benefit between July 1999 and June 2005, 48 per 
cent left because they had obtained work, 0.1 per cent died, 5.1 per cent left New 
Zealand and the rest left for a variety of other reasons. Similar statistics were 
available for other benefit types.  
It was assumed that the exit statistics detailed in the study applied to the 
corresponding aggregates of all the benefits in the model. However, since the model 
further divides these benefits into sub-categories (for example, UB is divided into 8 
sub-categories), the above procedure was used to derive exit rates for each of the sub-
categories without altering the overall exit rate for a particular benefit. This accounts 
for the fact that exit rates are not uniform across the sub-categories, for example older 
beneficiaries in receipt of a particular benefit are more likely to exit due to ‘death’ 
than beneficiaries in lower age-groups. Similarly, lower-age groups are more likely to 
exit due to migration or finding work. The procedure described above was used to 
account for this unevenness in the reasons for people leaving the benefit system. 
 
Appendix C. The Matrix Multiplier 
Consider the simple case of a two-state social accounting model, where the 
equilibrium stock,   1n I C b  , is given by: 
 
1
1 11 12 1
2 21 22 2
1
1
n c c b
n c c b
                 
 (13) 
                                                 
23 http://m.stats.govt.nz/~/media/Statistics/browse-categories/income-work/employment-
unemployment/leed/research-reports/leed-msd-feasibility-report-final-2.pdf 
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and: 
   
1 22 12 1
2 21 11 211 22 12 21
11
11 1
n c c b
n c c bc c c c
                 
 (14) 
The effect of a change in the vector of ‘inflows’ is thus straightforward, and is 
measured by the appropriate elements of the matrix   1M I C   : in matrix terms 
dn M
db
 . Consider the effect on, for example, 1n , of a change in the forward 
coefficient, 11c , where: 
    1 22 2 121 11 22 12 21
1
1 1
b c b c
n
c c c c
      (15) 
Differentiation gives: 
    1 22111 11 22 12 21
1
1 1
n cn
c c c c c
      (16) 
And using: 
 11 11
11
ndn dc
c
   (17) 
    221 111 11 22 12 21
1
1 1
cdn dc
n c c c c
     (18) 
Given the definition,   1M I C   , the proportional change in the equilibrium stock 
of individuals in state 1 arising from the combination of a change in inflows and a 
change in the proportion remaining in the state from one period to the next is given 
by: 
 1 111 11
1 1
dn dbm dc
n n
    
 (19) 
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